Introduction: This paper analyzes the formal structure of argumentation in contemporary legal theory. It traces how secular legal scholars, in their efforts to substantiate the existence of a “desired X” (such as legal objectivity, the autonomy of the self, or the progressive evolution of doctrine), unwittingly replicate classical theological models of reasoning and proofs for the existence of God.

Methods: The study employs a comparative analysis of legal argumentation and theological constructs. The author juxtaposes the concepts of Joseph Beale, Owen Fiss, Margaret Jane Radin, and Jack Balkin against the cosmological, teleological (argument from design), and ontological proofs of God’s existence, drawing upon Kantian critique of the substitution of the ontological for the epistemic.

Results and Discussion: The analysis reveals that legal scholars’ attempts to stabilize desired normativity inevitably involve a magical leap from thought to being. The first part demonstrates how Joseph Beale uses the logic of the “prime mover,” akin to Aquinas’s proof, to justify the self-evolution of the common law. The second part shows how Owen Fiss, in defending the objectivity of interpretation, postulates the existence of an “interpretive community” and “disciplining rules” based on the argument from design model. The third part elucidates how the defense of the autonomous “self” by modern theorists structurally repeats the Cartesian cogito and the ontological proof, failing to transcend the linguistic act to reach ontological reality. The author concludes that this substitution is not an error but a constitutive gesture of law as a system that requires the illusion of objectification to maintain its authority.

Conclusions: Law appears as a discourse suffering from a chronic deficit of ontological grounding and is therefore compelled to continuously reproduce theological structures of thought. Continuing to “do law” after the debunking of its metaphysical foundations is as problematic as continuing worship after the “death of God.” The shift from the epistemic to the ontological is not a logical failure but a necessary condition for the very idea of the rule of law.

Introduction: This work seeks to trace how the figure of God — in a literal or metaphorical sense — has manifested and evolved in the history of law as the ultimate foundation of the normative order. The article examines how, after the “death of God”, law continues to search for the ultimate foundation of normativity, replacing transcendent authority with secular dogmas (Grundnorm, Constitution, “public reason”).

Methods: The study employs comparative legal and historical-dogmatic analysis, interpretation of Nietzsche’s thesis and Münchhausen’s trilemma, as well as reconstruction of the practices of sacralization of legal text.

Results and discussion: It is demonstrated that both religious and secular theories of law inevitably reach an epistemological limit and compensate for it by creating new “substitutes for God” — canon, procedure, abstract values, and the symbolic authority of the court. This reveals the hidden dogmatism of liberal concepts and the illusion of procedural neutrality. The first part demonstrates the search for the ultimate foundation of law in the absence of an external guarantor, when one is left to seek an immanent axiom — one that is not imposed, yet without which the very experience of law is impossible. In the second part, the authors turn to the “sacralized” legal text and examine law, which, particularly in its dogmatic constructions, constitutes a complex system where the text acts as a canon, and the community of lawyers functions as priests who preserve and interpret its sacred meaning. The third part illustrates the solutions that legal scholarship resorts to in its search for the lost normativity.

Conclusions: Law emerges as an inevitably “faith-based” system, chronically experiencing a deficit of justification and therefore constantly producing new forms of sacralization of its own foundations.

Introduction: The article discusses the problematic issues of the concept, justification and implementation of legal doctrine. There are different positions in the scientific community of our country on these issues. The author offers his own position on how to justify legal doctrine in a situation of ontological, cultural and epistemological relativism, as well as how legal doctrines are implemented in practice.

Methodology and materials: The purpose of the study is to obtain new theoretical knowledge about the justification of legal doctrine and its practical implementation. The methodology used is dialogics as the interdependence and complementarity of the opposite aspects of the legal doctrine’s existence.

The results of the study and their discussion: An important issue is to determine the modes of existence of a legal doctrine. These include its perception, naming, acceptance (recognition), and practical use. The definition of a legal doctrine cannot be achieved through the rules of formal logic, such as genus and species, but rather through the analysis of its use by legal actors. The justification of a legal doctrine presents a paradoxical situation of theoretical pluralism and the need for the unification of doctrinal knowledge. The implementation of a legal doctrine is further complicated by the paradox of “following the rule.”

Conclusions: As a solution to the problems and paradoxes of the theoretical justification and practical implementation of the legal doctrine, the author suggests using the deliberation procedure.

Introduction: The article offers an epistemological deconstruction of the fundamental concept of legal positivism — the category of “fact.” The author calls into question the possibility of constructing an empirical theory of law within the framework of legal positivism, proceeding from the internal contradictions of its initial premises.

Methodology and Materials: The study relies on an interdisciplinary synthesis: Kantian transcendentalism, post-positivist philosophy of science, level methodology, the distinction between “brute” and “institutional” facts, communicative theory of law, and legal realism. Our method is the diagnosis of the gap. We do not merely apply ready-made tools; we expose the fundamental gap between the Is (text, fact, behavior) and the Ought (norm, obligation, justice) at the very heart of legal cognition.

Results and Discussion: It is demonstrated that positivism operates with an ambiguous concept of fact, tacitly identifying: fact N 1 (empirical): the physical existence of the legal text (paper, ink, file) and fact N 2 (transcendental): the normative force of the prescription, its bindingness, not given in experience but attributed to the text through the act of interpretation and recognition. This substitution masks the logical leap across “Hume’s guillotine”, pretending that “ought” is derived from “is”, whereas in reality, it is embedded in the premise before the syllogism begins. The level methodology uncovers the mechanism behind the birth of a “quasi-empirical” object — a text endowed with the properties of legal meaning. The true source of law’s binding force is discovered at the meta-theoretical level — in acts of intersubjective recognition rooted in the normativity of consciousness.

Conclusions: Legal positivism cannot be considered an empirical theory of law. Law has no sensory givenness — there is no “star called Law” to observe. What positivism presents as “facts” (texts, decisions, practices) are merely material traces of interpretation, not the normative reality itself. The only thing jurisprudence deals with is acts of interpretation and recognition, through which normative force is attributed to a text. These acts are not observed; they are performed. They are not a reflection of givenness but a creation of social reality. Acknowledging this fact is not a weakness but a condition of honesty for legal science, which must abandon the positivist illusion of “solid ground” and accept its responsibility for constructing what it claims merely to describe.

Introduction: Legal principles are time-tested, which correspond to the legal traditions and values of society. The development of digital technologies leads to the expansion of human rights, restrictions in modern technological solutions. Such a situation in the disclosure with the principle of “black box”, due to the opacity of algorithms, decisions made with the help of artificial intelligence, is a challenge for the legislator.

Methodology and materials: The purpose of the article is the idea of the concept of the principle of freedom of choice and autonomy of the will of the individual when handling digital technologies. When writing the article, both general scientific and specific methods were used: analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, systematization, comparative legal, historical, formal legal methods, the method of legal analysis.

Results of the study and their discussion: The article substantiates the legal consolidation of the principles of freedom of choice and democracy of the will of the individual when handling digital technologies as one of the elements of the system of a codified act in the field of information legal relations. The axiological foundations of these principles, in particular the values of freedom and security, are considered. It is noted that freedom of choice in interaction with digital technologies ensures the provision of services to others, including constitutional rights of man and citizen. The category of autonomy is defined, such aspects as ensuring a special environment, awareness, positive regulation of the conditions of autonomy, when manipulation grows as coercion and interference in autonomy. The implementation of principles in such areas as the right to judicial protection, the sphere of consumer protection, education, ensuring inviolability and protection of private life, electoral rights, lending is considered. The external and internal side of the principle, its content, including various rights, restrictions related to issues of ensuring security and significance are highlighted.

Conclusions: The essence of the principle of freedom of choice and autonomy of the Constitution is to ensure freedom in the presence of artificial intelligence, algorithms, choice of online services, provision of full information in an accessible form or intelligent solutions based on algorithms, preliminary refusal to exercise rights using digital technologies, appealing decisions made using technologies. The principle of freedom and democracy in the autonomy of the will of man included the complexity of rights and guarantees of their implementation, minimizing the risks arising in the digital era. The specified principle is contained in the consolidation of the Digital (Information) code and can further influence various areas of application of digital technologies, determine legal regulation in various entities and establish, directly used by the law enforcement officer, thus ensuring the resolution of controversial situations arising in the context of legal collisions and events.

Introduction: In Russian legal scholarship, issues of humane and moral treatment of animals remain insufficiently studied, despite the fact that corresponding requirements are enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, presidential decrees, and legislation. The absence of clear legal definitions of “humaneness” and “morality” complicates law enforcement. This article presents an analysis of philosophical categories and legal principles that mandate the humane treatment of animals.

Methodology and materials: The article was prepared using legal-dogmatic, systemic, comparative and structural methods.

Results and Discussion: Based on scientific knowledge of the concepts of “humanity”, “morality” and “morals”, the author proposes her vision of how these concepts relate to each other and to the concept of “ethics”. The article also provides the analysis of individual categories of morality: “good”, “evil”, “duty”, “conscience”, as well as the possibility of their application not only in relations between people, but also in relation to people’s treatment of animals. The article includes an analysis of modern concepts for legal protection of biological species of animals. The author outlines the process by which moral norms are transformed into legal norms and explains the conditions necessary for such transformation, using the example of the norms and principles of the Federal Law of 27.12.2018 No. 498-FZ “On Responsibility for Animals and on Amendments to the Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation”.

Conclusions: The main concepts of morality: “good”, “evil”, “duty” and “conscience” are fully applicable to issues of animal treatment. The need for a humane and moral attitude towards animals and providing them with legal protection is fully justified by the ability of animals to experience pain and suffering; this concept is sufficient to develop rational criteria for providing legal protection. At the same time, in order to include moral concepts (“humanity” and “morality”) in legal norms, it is necessary to integrate them into the law, transforming them into legal norms-principles, which should be accompanied by the introduction of other regulatory norms (rules, requirements, restrictions and prohibitions) establishing responsibilities for people and sanctions for their violation.

Introduction: The article examines the formation of key approaches to the performance fee purpose, tracing its evolution from a coercion measure to a public-law (administrative) liability measure within domestic legislation and law enforcement practice. Emphasis is placed on the fact that law enforcers are moving away from assigning the enforcement fee a stimulating function and rarely perceive it as a means prompting debtors towards lawful behavior.

Methodology and materials: A complex of scientific cognition methods was employed, including the formal legal, historical legal, comparative legal methods, as well as the method of systems analysis and analysis of judicial practice. Using techniques of analysis and synthesis, doctrinal approaches to the legal nature of the enforcement fee were systematized, and the author’s original conception of this institution as a unique one, with features inherent only to it, was developed.

The purpose of the article is to trace the evolution of approaches to imposing the enforcement fee, identify the reasons for the shift of focus from its stimulating function to its punitive function, and propose a comprehensive perspective on its legal nature.

Results and discussion: Based on the analysis of the constitutive properties of direct and indirect coercive measures used in enforcement proceedings, the untenability of equating the performance fee with direct coercive measures and the ambiguity of its assimilation to indirect coercive measures are demonstrated. The judgment is advanced that the performance fee aligns with measures of administrative coercion due to the presence of identical characteristics and the public-law foundations of its legal nature.

Conclusion: The performance fee combines characteristics of both an indirect, administrative coercive measure and a measure of liability. This duality of features is present at the stage of enforcement proceedings, with the predominance of one or the other depending on the actuality or potentiality of collecting the performance fee. It is substantiated that the enforcement fee gravitates towards being a complex legal category endowed with the features of adaptability, accessory nature, dependence on the initial claim, and the debtor’s behavior.

Introduction: Issues of subjects of law and subjects of legal relations attract the attention of scholars belonging to various branches of law, but the works devoted to this topic do not illuminate the whole essence of the problem, as there are aspects that have never been considered when studying subjects of law and subjects of legal relations. The article discusses the topic of subjects of law and legal relations in the absence of a citizen, which has not aroused scientific interest, in legal literature such studies are not presented. A citizen can be recognized as missing in action if there is no information about his place of residence, while the subject of law as an individual is a complexly structured subject and when a person is recognized as missing in action, the existence of a component part of an individual, namely, a legal personality, is not always taken into account by the legislator. When analyzing the subject of law and legal relations, it can be concluded that when considering these subjects through the lens of a citizen’s missing in action, there is a transformation of the view of an individual as an individual — a citizen and a legal personality, which allows for a new perspective on the legal regulation of various social relations.

Methodology and materials: The work uses a comparative legal analysis of legislation, the general scientific (dialectical) method of cognition, formal-logical interpretation, system and comparative analysis, the historical method, and the method of historicism. The study is based on the main and key regulatory acts. The theoretical basis of the work is the main works.

The results of the study and their discussion: The analysis of the norms showed that the novelties regarding the regulation of relations arising from unknown absence concern procedural issues, as well as issues related to the declaration of death of unknown absent citizens. At the same time, through the prism of unknown absence, it is clearly visible that an individual citizen can disappear and be declared missing, but a legal entity cannot. When dealing with issues related to the disappearance of a person and/or the declaration of a person missing, there is a problem that the legislator does not consider that a legal entity cannot disappear or be declared missing, and this is only partially addressed by the legislator. Thus, as a participant in legal relations, an unknown absentee citizen is unable to fulfill their obligations towards other persons, and these obligations are fulfilled through certain legal means, such as the institution of trust management, etc.

Conclusions: When analyzing the subject of law and legal relations, it can be concluded that viewing these subjects through the lens of an unknown absentee citizen transforms the perception of an individual as an individual citizen and a legal personality, offering a fresh perspective on the legal regulation of various social relations.

Introduction: The article is devoted to the study of the legal nature of agreements on the implementation of large-scale investment projects concluded on the basis of Article 39.6 of the Land Code of the Russian Federation.

Methodology and materials: The methodological basis of the research consists of comparative legal and formal legal methods used to analyze regional legislation and judicial practice, as well as the method of system analysis. The paper provides a comparative analysis of regional legislation that establishes qualifying criteria for recognizing an investment project as large-scale, such as socio-economic significance, minimum investment, job creation and increased tax revenues.

Research results: The author identifies the problem of terminological ambiguity and blurred criteria, which creates risks of abuse in law enforcement practice. The main focus is on the analysis of agreements on the implementation of large-scale investment projects that combine private and public law principles. It is proved that the public-law nature of such an agreement is determined by its focus on achieving the public interest. The novelty lies in considering the agreement on the implementation of a large-scale investment project through the prism of the concept of a public law contract, the subject of which covers socially useful activities aimed at sustainable economic growth and improving the well-being of citizens. The author points out the need to adjust regional legislation on large-scale investment projects in terms of priority areas of implementation to ensure a balance of public and private interests.

Conclusion: The public-legal nature of agreements on the implementation of large–scale investment projects is reflected in their subject matter — socially useful activities of entrepreneurs aimed at creating conditions for sustainable economic growth of the country and improving the well-being of citizens. 

Introduction: This article presents a comprehensive study of the legal status and functional role of the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat within the institutional architecture of the Arctic Council. The relevance of the research is driven by the insufficient examination of this body in the academic literature. Performing primarily auxiliary functions, the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat remains an institutionally constrained element in the system of representation of the interests of the Arctic indigenous population.

Methodology and Materials: The methodological framework includes documentary, comparative legal, and statistical methods, as well as the expert assessment method. The theoretical foundation is institutional analysis of international organizations. The empirical base is formed on the basis of ministerial declarations, regulatory documents of the secretariats, annual reports, and academic publications.

Research Results and Discussion: The primary challenge is the funding deficit, which hinders the full-fledged participation of indigenous peoples in the activities of the Arctic Council’s bodies. Despite the lack of voting rights, Permanent Participants effectively influence the Council’s agenda through informal mechanisms. The integration of the secretariat into the Council’s structure and its relocation to Tromsø did not alter its legal status, while ensuring an expansion of its representational functions at the cost of a slight reduction in autonomy.

Conclusions: A change in the legal status of the secretariat is not a pressing issue for the Arctic Council. States are not prepared to expand its mandate, while Permanent Participants are satisfied with the de facto recognition of their influence. The practical significance of the study lies in systematizing the institutional constraints on indigenous participation in Arctic governance.

Introduction: Backtracking is a classic conflict-of-laws problem with a missing unified approach to solving it. In order to harmonize private international law (PIL) and its development, it is necessary to analyze the foreign experience of reforming relevant legal institutions, as well as the approaches developed in relation to them in foreign doctrine and practice. At the same time, the PIL of Latin America, having a long history, has not received a comprehensive analysis and understanding in the Russian doctrine. Modern researchers prefer to analyze the renvoi institute of legal systems close to the Russian one and either superficially and descriptively consider the reverse reference in modern Latin American law, or express erroneous judgments and legal qualifications.

Methodology and materials: The purpose of the work is to build a system-integrated view of the renvoi institute in Latin American countries. The author sets the following tasks: to analyze approaches to understanding and evaluating the institution of feedback in foreign doctrine; to form a list of legal and law enforcement features of the implementation of the renvoi institute; to identify the positive and negative features of the implementation of renvoi in the relevant countries. The author applies methods of cognition (analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, critical and dialectical methods), as well as methods specific directly to legal science (structural-logical, formal-legal, comparative-legal).

Research results: The results of the work and individual conclusions can be borrowed for the development of the institution of feedback in national systems. The practical significance lies in the possibility of using the basic provisions in the application of the law of Latin American States, as well as in resolving disputes with the relevant foreign element.

Conclusions: The author has not identified a single country from the list of reviewed countries, whose laws provide for the use of exclusively retroactive references to their national law. Most Latin American countries adhere to the concept of the need to allow the return of both degrees, but with a number of important conditions. The results of the study allowed the author to form a classification depending on the characteristics of the renvoi institute in Latin American countries.

Introduction: the existence of a separate legal regime for investments and the necessity of investment legislation systematization are debatable issues. On the one hand, due to the multiplicity of legal acts and the lack of consistency in investment legislation it is impossible to approve unified legal regime of investments. On the other hand, there are a number of basis for highlighting the legal regulation of the investments as a separate legal regime.

Methodology and materials: analysis and comparison are used for identifying criteria and peculiarities of research objects, a dialectical method is used for identifying contradictions and offering substantiations. Material base: scientific articles and Russian investment legislation.

Results of the study and their discussion: the article provides a general description of the “legal regime” scientific category, which makes it possible to conclude about the usefulness of indicating the “legal regime of investments” as a specific scientific category. There is a whitespace in systematic understanding of the legal regime of investments in scientific doctrine and findings about impracticability of codifying Russian investment legislation.

Conclusions: three directions of understanding the “legal regime” category are highlighted; several characteristics of legal regimes as scientific categories are defined; the acceptability of indicating the legal regime of investments as an special scientific category are substantiated; the content and scope of the “legal regime” category are defined; a scientific definition of the category “legal regime of investments” is proposed.

Introduction: There are currently two opposing trends in the way the legal nature of a limited liability company is understood. On the one hand, legislator is increasingly bringing the legal regimes of non-public joint-stock companies and limited liability companies closer together by combining them into a single group of non-public companies. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation’s recent practice clearly demonstrates an understanding of a limited liability company as a type of partnership. To what extent is the ‘partnership’ approach justified? This issue needs to be studied.

Methodology and materials: The methodological basis of the study is general scientific methods, primarily the method of systems analysis. Specialized legal methods are also employed, including formal legal analysis, historical legal analysis, legal modelling and economic analysis of law (transaction cost theory).

Results of the study and their discussion: The “partnership” model of a limited liability company, in which participants are in contractual legal relationships with one another, is generally ineffective. This is because the addition of another participant multiplies legally significant ties and consequently increases transaction costs. It was precisely as a result of this fundamental factor, which hindered the attraction of direct investment and the turnover of shares in the authorized capital, that legislator was forced to abandon the recognition of the founding agreement (memorandum of association) as the founding document of a limited liability company, thereby completely switching to a capitalist model. The influence of the personality factor of the participants does not in itself entail the recognition of a limited liability company as a modified type of partnership, since a participant has the legal ability to influence the activities of the company within the framework of the legal participation relationship linking the participant and the company, and not through direct legal influence on the activities of another participant. Nevertheless, elements of a partnership are evident when all company members enter into a corporate agreement. However, even in this case, the company does not acquire all the characteristics necessary for it to be considered a partnership.

Conclusions: The model of a limited liability company is more complex than that of a partnership and should not be reduced to the latter. The discretionary nature of the legislation on limited liability companies allows for the application of various models that take into account the degree of involvement of participants in the management of activities. Attempts to make the “partnership” model of a limited liability company universal may lead to a significant decrease in the effectiveness of using this legal form as a means of attracting direct investment and managing separate property.

Introduction: The research is devoted to the study of the role of the institute of lost profit in civil law, especially in the form of a form of protection of civil rights. Despite the precise consolidation in Articles 15, 393 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, issues dedicated to the subject of proving lost profit remain controversial. The discrepancy in the approaches and understanding of the courts to determining the subject of proof, as well as the presence of problematic issues in civil and arbitration procedural law determine the need to study the existing positions.

Methodology: The research methodology was based on general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, systems approach) and specific scientific methods (formal-legal, comparative-legal). The empirical basis was formed by the norms of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, as well as the clarifications of the highest judicial authorities — resolutions of the Plenums of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. An analysis of judicial practice was carried out, including specific cases examined by arbitration courts and the Intellectual Property Court in the period from 2020 to 2025. The purpose of the study is to identify the features of the subject of proof in cases involving the recovery of lost profits.

Results: As an independent institution, lost profits began to form more steadily in the 20th century, which resulted in an increase in the number of cases considered by courts on issues of lost profits recovery. The determination of the subject of proof in cases of lost profits recovery depends on the category of obligations (contractual, corporate, delictual) and the circumstances of the dispute. It has been revealed that the most frequent grounds for refusing a claim are the failure to prove a direct causal link between the defendant’s actions and the lost income, as well as the absence of reliable, documented, and substantiated calculations of the amount of lost profits. At the same time, courts recognize lost profits as an evaluative category, and the main calculation methods are based on discounting cash flows; however, uniform criteria for assessing “ordinary conditions of civil circulation” and a reasonable degree of reliability of calculations have not yet been formed in law enforcement practice.

Conclusions: Conducting a forensic examination facilitates the calculation of clearer and more precise lost profits, as well as the identification of financial facts and the grounds for their occurrence.

Introduction: The value of Roman private law lies not only in being a necessary element of the professional education of a modern lawyer but also as a general cultural foundation for erudition and broadening one’s horizons. The purpose of this review is to assess the scholarly and methodological components of the textbook under review and to identify its distinctive features in comparison with other textbooks on Roman private law.

Methodology and materials: Various methods of analysis are used for the review, such as comparative, historical, logical, and others.

Results of the study: The review demonstrates the author’s understanding of the essence of Roman private law, which is quite reasonably defined not as an abstract set of norms existing outside time and space, but as a phenomenon conditioned by the historical and sociocultural circumstances of Roman society at different stages of its development. Without considering this context, the academic discipline of Roman private law largely loses its cognitive value.

Conclusions: The reviewed textbook possesses a high scholarly and methodological standard; its content corresponds to the current level of development of legal science and law enforcement practice. It can be recommended for use in educational institutions that implement educational programs in Roman private law.