Fact as Illusion: Why Positivism Cannot Be an Empirical Theory of Law

Introduction: The article offers an epistemological deconstruction of the fundamental concept of legal positivism — the category of “fact.” The author calls into question the possibility of constructing an empirical theory of law within the framework of legal positivism, proceeding from the internal contradictions of its initial premises.

Methodology and Materials: The study relies on an interdisciplinary synthesis: Kantian transcendentalism, post-positivist philosophy of science, level methodology, the distinction between “brute” and “institutional” facts, communicative theory of law, and legal realism. Our method is the diagnosis of the gap. We do not merely apply ready-made tools; we expose the fundamental gap between the Is (text, fact, behavior) and the Ought (norm, obligation, justice) at the very heart of legal cognition.

Results and Discussion: It is demonstrated that positivism operates with an ambiguous concept of fact, tacitly identifying: fact N 1 (empirical): the physical existence of the legal text (paper, ink, file) and fact N 2 (transcendental): the normative force of the prescription, its bindingness, not given in experience but attributed to the text through the act of interpretation and recognition. This substitution masks the logical leap across “Hume’s guillotine”, pretending that “ought” is derived from “is”, whereas in reality, it is embedded in the premise before the syllogism begins. The level methodology uncovers the mechanism behind the birth of a “quasi-empirical” object — a text endowed with the properties of legal meaning. The true source of law’s binding force is discovered at the meta-theoretical level — in acts of intersubjective recognition rooted in the normativity of consciousness.

Conclusions: Legal positivism cannot be considered an empirical theory of law. Law has no sensory givenness — there is no “star called Law” to observe. What positivism presents as “facts” (texts, decisions, practices) are merely material traces of interpretation, not the normative reality itself. The only thing jurisprudence deals with is acts of interpretation and recognition, through which normative force is attributed to a text. These acts are not observed; they are performed. They are not a reflection of givenness but a creation of social reality. Acknowledging this fact is not a weakness but a condition of honesty for legal science, which must abandon the positivist illusion of “solid ground” and accept its responsibility for constructing what it claims merely to describe.

1. Alova, D. G., Lushnikova, V. A. (2025) Law and Morality: The Dialectics of Relations in the Positivist Concept. Theoretical and Applied Law. No. 4 (26). Pp. 58–68. (In Russ.)

2. Antonov, M. V., Poliakov, A. V. (2008) Law and Legal Cultures in the XXI Century: Distinction and Unity (XXII World Congress of the International Association of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy). News of Higher Educational Institutions. Jurisprudence. No. 2 (277). Pp. 124–147. (In Russ.)

3. Antonov, M. V. (2013) On the Basic Elements of G. Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law and State. Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS. No. 4. Pp. 169–196. (In Russ.)

4. Antonov, M. V. (2016) A Few Introductory Words About ‘The efficacy of law’ by E. V. Bulygin. Jurisprudence. No. 4 (327). Pp. 6–15. (In Russ.)

5. Antonov, M. V. and Ogneznev, V. V. (2020) Legal positivism and truth in law. Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS. No. 15 (4). Pp. 42–61. (In Russ.)

6. Antonov, M. V. (2025) Communication and validity of law in A. V. Polyakov’s conception. Russian justice. No. 5. Pp. 23–33. DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.52433/01316761_2025_05_23 (In Russ.)

7. Babaev, V. K. (1976) Logical-Legal Development of Legal Norms. Jurisprudence. No. 2. Pp. 7–12. (In Russ.)

8. Baranov, V. M. (1989) The Truth of the Norms of Soviet Law: Problems of Theory and Practice. Saratov State University (Publishing House). 397 p. (In Russ.)

9. Bulygin, E. V. (2013) Logic and Law. Jurisprudence. No. 4 (309). Pp. 12–17. (In Russ.)

10. Bulygin, E. V. (2015) My Vision of Rationality in Law. Jurisprudence. No. 5 (322). Pp. 17–23. (In Russ.)

11. Bulygin, E. V. (2011) What is Legal Positivism? Jurisprudence. No. 4 (297). Pp. 236–245. (In Russ.)

12. Gadzhiev, G. A. (2013) Ontology of Law (a Critical Study of the Legal Concept of Reality). Norma, INFRAM Publ. 320 p. (In Russ.)

13. Gadzhiev, G. A. (2012) Official Interpretation of the Constitution: a Combination of Ontological and Epistemological Approaches. Jurisprudence. No. 1 (300). Pp. 130–154. (In Russ.)

14. Davydova, M. L. (2009) Legal Technique: Problems of Theory and Methodology. Volgograd State University (Publishing House). 318 p. (In Russ.)

15. Kelsen, H. (2015) Pure Theory of Law. Alef­Press. 542 p.

16. Kraevsky, A. A., Timoshina, E. V. (2012) The problem of self-reference in law: on the history of the discussion. News of higher educational institutions. Jurisprudence. No. 3 (302). Pp. 35–43. (In Russ.)

17. Lebedev, S. A. (2010) Levels of Scientific Knowledge. Questions of Philosophy. No. 1. Pp. 62–75. (In Russ.)

18. Lebedev, S. A. (2021) The Level Structure of Scientific Knowledge. Bulletin of Tver State University. Series Philosophy. No. 2. Pp. 7–20. https://doi.org/10.26456/vtphilos/2021.2.007 (In Russ.)

19. Lebedev, S. A. (2021) Conventionalism and Consensualism as an Epistemological Legitimation of Scientific Pluralism. Bulletin of Moscow State Regional University. Series: Philosophical Sciences. No. 1. Pp. 119–129. https://doi.org/10.18384/2310-7227-2021-1-119-129 (In Russ.)

20. Lebedev, S. A. (2022) The Problem of Demarcation of Scientific Knowledge and Its Evolution. Bulletin of Moscow State Regional University. Series: Philosophical Sciences. No. 3. Pp. 79–89. https://doi.org/10.18384/2310-7227-2022-3-79-89 (In Russ.)

21. Lebedev, S. A. and Minakov, A. A. (2023) Sensory Cognition in Science. Humanitarian Bulletin. No. 4. Pp. 1–10. https://doi.org/10.18698/2306-8477-2023-4-857 (In Russ.)

22. Lebedev, S. A., Rebrishchev V. D. (2024) Philosophical Foundations of Classical, Non-Classical and PostNon-Classical Science. Modern Philosophical Studies. No. 1. Pp. 57–66. https://doi.org/10.18384/29495148-2024-1-57-66 (In Russ.)

23. Maksimov, L. V. (2012) Hume’s Guillotine: Pro et Contra. Ethical Thought. No. 12. Pp. 124–142. (In Russ.)

24. Osvetimskaya, I. I. (2025) Polyakov’s Communicative Theory of Law as a Postclassical Anthropological Approach to Law: A Critical Analysis of Opponents’ Comments. Theoretical and Applied Jurisprudence. No. 3. Pp. 55–70. EDN: HGKSSX (In Russ.)

25. Permyakov, Yu. E. (2006) Philosophical Foundations of Jurisprudence. Samara: Samara Humanitarian Academy (Publishing House). 248 p. (In Russ.)

26. Permiakov, Yu. E. (2007) Empirical Foundations of Legal Science. Bulletin of the Samara Humanitarian Academy. Series Law. No. 1. Pp. 43–54. (In Russ.)

27. Poliakov, A. V. (2016) L. Petrazhytsky’s Psychological Theory of Law in the Light of the Communicative Approach. Jurisprudence. No. 5 (328). Pp. 144–155. (In Russ.)

28. Poliakov, A. V. (2021) The Principle of Mutual Legal Recognition: the Russian Philosophical-Legal Tradition and the Communicative Approach to Law. Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS. Vol. 16, No. 6. Pp. 39–101. http://doi.org/10.35427/2073-4522-2021-16-6-polyakov (In Russ.)

29. Popper, K. R. (2008) Assumptions and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. AST. 638 p.

30. Davydova, M. L., et al. (2024) Legal Means of Smart Regulation in the Context of Major Challenges. RUSAINS. 242 p. (In Russ.)

31. Razuvaev, N. V. (2020) Sign Communication as an Ontological Basis for Constructing Legal Reality. In the collection: Legal Communication of the State and Society: Domestic and Foreign Experience. Collection of Papers of the International Scientific Conference. Voronezh. Pp. 148–154. (In Russ.)

32. Razuvaev, N. V. (2015) Law: A Social Constructivist Approach. News of Higher Educational Institutions. Jurisprudence. No. 5 (322). Pp. 48–98. (In Russ.)

33. Razuvaev, N. V. (2020) Legal Thinking in the Semiotic Space of Legal Reality // In the book: Legal Thinking: Classical and Postclassical Paradigms. Aleteya, Pp. 108–153. (In Russ.)

34. Razuvaev, N. V. (2024) The Idea of Legal Communication as a New Organon of Legal Science. Theoretical and Applied Jurisprudence. No. 3 (21). Pp. 4–8. https://doi.org/10.22394/3034-2813-2024-3-4-8 (In Russ.)

35. Ross, Alf. (2009). Validity and the conflict between legal positivism and natural law. Russian Yearbook of Law. No. 2. Pp. 456–473.

36. Rozov, M. A. (2010) Invariants of Empirical and Theoretical Knowledge. Philosophy of Science. Vol. 15. No. 1. Pp. 110–129. (In Russ.)

37. Syrykh, V. M. (2001) Logical Foundations of the General Theory of Law: In 2 vols. Vol. 1: Elemental Composition. Legal House Yustitsinform. 528 p. (In Russ.)

38. Tarasov, N. N. (2000) Legal constructions in law and scientific research (methodological problems). Russian Law Journal. No. 3 (27). Pp. 25–36. (In Russ.)

39. Avdeev, D. A., Averin, A. V., Bogatyrev, V. V. [et al.]. (2025) Theory and metatheory of legal contradictions: from legal conflict to legal order. Vladimir branch of RANEPA (Publishing House). 324 p. (In Russ.)

40. Timoshina, E. V. (2013) Law as an ‘idea’, as a ‘fiction’, and as a ‘fact’: on nominalism and realism in legal theory. Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS. No. 4. Pp. 48–76. (In Russ.)

41. Timoshina, E. V., Vasil’eva, N. S., Kondurov, V. E., and Kraevskii, A. A. (2023) The three kingdoms of law: reality, efficacy, legitimacy. edited by E. V. Timoshina. S.­Peterb. State University (Publishing House). 646 p. (In Russ.)

42. Tonkov, E. N. (2024) Russian Legal Realism. Aletheia. 454 p. (In Russ.)

43. Tonkov, E. N. (2020) Forecasting Changes in the Legal Situation as the Main Function of Legal Thinking. In the book: Legal Thinking: Classical and Postclassical Paradigms. Aletheia. Pp. 92–145. (In Russ.)

44. Trubetskoi, E. N. (1998) Encyclopedia of Law. Lan’. 224 p. (In Russ.)

45. Hart, G. L. A. (2007) The Concept of Law / translated from English. St. Petersburg University Press (Publishing House). 302 p.

46. Chestnov, I. L. (2016) The Constructivist Paradigm in Jurisprudence. News of Higher Educational Institutions. Jurisprudence. No. 2 (325). Pp. 62–93. (In Russ.)

47. Chestnov, I. L. (2012) Postclassical Theory of Law. Jurisprudence Series. Alef­Press. 649 p. (In Russ.)

48. Shakhanov, V. V. (2023) General characteristics of the meta-theory of law. in Meta-theory and methodology of law and legal order: collective monograph, edited by A. V. Averin and M. L. Davydova. Vladimir. State University Publ. 249 p. (In Russ.)

49. Zykov, D. V. (2025). The Central Aporia of the Philosophy of Positive Law: Punctum Archimedis. Legal Paradigm. No. 4. Pp. 20–26.

50. Kelsen, H. (1963) Diskussionsbeitrag. In: Das Naturrecht in der Politischen Theorie. Springer. 168 p.

51. Kelsen, H. (1979) Allgemeine Theorie Der Normen. Manz. 362 p.

52. Searle, J. R. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. Free Press. 256 p.