The Performative Nature of Legal Language and the Construction of Legal Reality
EDN: HWETUZ
Abstract
Introduction. The article examines the normativity of legal language through the lens of speech act theory, emphasizing its performative nature. The author argues that legal language cannot be reduced to a purely descriptive function: it not only refers to norms but actively produces legally significant actions.
Methodology and materials. The study applies an analytic method and offers a theoretical reconstruction of key philosophical approaches, primarily the performative theories of J. L. Austin, H. L. A. Hart, and J. R. Searle. Legal texts, including statutes and regulations, are used to illustrate the pragmatic functioning of legal language in institutional contexts.
Results and discussion. The article presents that the normativity of legal language manifests chiefly in its capacity to generate legal consequences through speech acts. The distinction between normative and descriptive statements in law is analyzed, along with the specific features of legal performatives such as commands, prohibitions, and permissions. Legal discourse is shown to be marked by institutional validity and contextual dependence.
Conclusions. Legal language exhibits a distinct type of normativity realized through performative speech acts. This normativity is not reducible to logical implication or moral obligation, but is grounded in institutional rules that determine the legal force of utterances. Thus, legal language is not merely a vehicle for expressing norms, but a mechanism for their institutional enactment.
About the Author
V. V. Ogleznev
Saint Petersburg State University; Gorno-Altaisk State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Vitaly V. Ogleznev, Professor of the Department of Theory and History of the State and Law, Doctor of Science (Philosophy), Associate Professor; Leading Research Fellow
Saint Petersburg
Gorno-Altaisk
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Review
For citations:
Ogleznev V.V. The Performative Nature of Legal Language and the Construction of Legal Reality. Theoretical and Applied Law. 2025;(3):87-98. (In Russ.) EDN: HWETUZ
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