Law and Morality: The Dialectics of Relations in the Positivist Concept

Introduction. The article examines the relationship between law and morality through the lens of legal positivism, focusing on the distinction between inclusive and exclusive approaches. The main research question is the following dichotomy: exclusive positivism emphasizes the autonomy of law, excluding moral grounds, while inclusive positivism allows for the integration of moral principles into the legal system.

Methodology and materials. The research methodology is based on analytical jurisprudence, historical legal analysis, and comparative analysis. The works of G. L. A. Hart, R. Dworkin, J. Raz, W. J. Valuchov and others.

Results and discussion. It was revealed that inclusive positivism provides a more flexible understanding of law that can take into account moral values in the process of law enforcement, which is especially important in the field of constitutional law. Exclusive positivism, on the other hand, limits the influence of moral arguments, which can reduce the adaptability of the legal system. The analysis of G. L. A. Hart’s ideas demonstrates the possibility of a minimal intersection of law and morality, whereas J. L. A. Hart’s arguments demonstrate the possibility of a minimal intersection of law and morality. The arguments (linguistic, prejudice, and institutional) confirm the position of the independence of law from morality. Examples from judicial practice, including cases related to apartheid, illustrate the difficulty of separating law and morality.

Conclusions. The visible prospects for further research are related to clarifying the role of moral principles in modern lawmaking and developing balanced models of legal understanding that allow taking into account both the formal and value foundations of law.

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