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Теоретическая и прикладная юриспруденция

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АНТИМОНОПОЛЬНОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ КАК СИМПТОМ ДИСФУНКЦИИ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ СИСТЕМЫ

Рамси А. Вудкок

(Перевод И. К. Шмарко, Н. В. Разуваева)

https://doi.org/10.22394/2686-7834-2022-1-7-44

Полный текст:

Аннотация

Современный интерес американцев к использованию антимонопольного регулирования для решения проблемы имущественного неравенства является симптомом дисфункции американской политической системы, а не проявлением стремления к решению проблемы неравенства. При этом как первые представители американского прогрессивизма сто лет назад, так и современный экономист Тома Пикетти, чья работа привлекла повышенное внимание к проблеме неравенства доходов, солидарны в том, что источником неравенства является дефицит, а не монополия, и поэтому оно будет сохраняться даже на совершенно конкурентных рынках. Единственное эффективное решение для борьбы с неравенством — это использование налоговых инструментов, а не потенциально разрушительная борьба с монополистами путем их разделения.

Есть две причины, по которым в настоящее время в Соединенных Штатах меры антимонопольного регулирования получают широкую популярность. Во-первых, это расцвет антиэтатизма в США, который привел к отказу от использования налоговых инструментов для решения проблемы неравенства, вынуждая ученых и активистов искать иные обходные пути в рамках антимонопольной политики. Во-вторых, американская пресса, которая активно пропагандирует необходимость применения антимонопольных мер в целях выиграть борьбу с корпорациями Google и Facebook за рекламные доходы. Учитывая истоки происхождения современного американского антимонополизма, можно сделать вывод о том, что правительствам других стран, стремящимся решить проблему неравенства, не следует руководствоваться американским опытом, особенно если у них есть возможность использовать инструменты налоговой политики.

Редакция выражает признательность автору за предоставленную возможность опубликовать перевод статьи на русский язык.  Статью на английском языке, включая изменения, внесенные после публикации настоящего перевода, вы можете найти на сайте https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/jgucv/  The editors express their gratitude to the author for the opportunity to publish the translation of the article into Russian. This research was supported by a grant from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. The original English version of this article, as well as updates made after the creation of this translation, can be found at https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/jgucv/).

Об авторе

Рамси А. Вудкок
Университет Кентукки
Соединённые Штаты Америки

Рамси А. Вудкок – доцент, Юридический колледж Розенберга Университета Кентукки, факультет менеджмента, Гаттонский колледж бизнеса и экономики Университета Кентукки



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Для цитирования:


Вудкок Р.А. АНТИМОНОПОЛЬНОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ КАК СИМПТОМ ДИСФУНКЦИИ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ СИСТЕМЫ. Теоретическая и прикладная юриспруденция. 2022;(1):7-44. https://doi.org/10.22394/2686-7834-2022-1-7-44

For citation:


Woodcock R.A. ANTIMONOPOLISM AS A SYMPTOM OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION. Theoretical and Applied Law. 2022;(1):7-44. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.22394/2686-7834-2022-1-7-44

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