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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">tal</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Теоретическая и прикладная юриспруденция</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Theoretical and Applied Law</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">3034-2813</issn><publisher><publisher-name>СЗИУ РАНХиГС</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22394/2686-7834-2023-4-62-67</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">tal-326</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Природа права на благоприятную окружающую среду: принцип vs норма права</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The Juridical Nature of the Right to Favorable Environment: Principle vs Norm of Law</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Бахилина</surname><given-names>А. К.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Bakhilina</surname><given-names>A. K.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Бахилина Алена Константиновна,  студентка магистратуры </p><p>Москва </p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Alena K. Bakhilina, MA-student</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">akbakhilina@edu.hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>15</day><month>01</month><year>2024</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>62</fpage><lpage>67</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Бахилина А.К., 2024</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2024</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Бахилина А.К.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Bakhilina A.K.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.taljournal.ru/jour/article/view/326">https://www.taljournal.ru/jour/article/view/326</self-uri><abstract><p>Настоящая статья ставит своей целью проверить гипотезу автора о том, что право на благоприятную окружающую среду по своей юридической природе ближе к принципу, нежели к норме права. Рассмотрена теоретическая база разграничения принципа и нормы правы, особенное внимание уделено изучению теории американского юриста и философа Рональда Дворкина. Опираясь на концепцию Дворкина, автор методом аналогии приводит аргументы в поддержку своей гипотезы. Подтверждение выдвинутой идеи обнаружено также в решениях международных судов. В ходе написания статьи проведен серьезный анализ нормативно-правовой базы, доктринальных источников и судебной практики.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article aims to test the author’s hypothesis that the right to favorable environment by its legal nature is rather closer to a principle than to a legal norm. The theoretical basis of the distinction between principle and norm of law is considered, special attention is paid to the study of the theory of the American lawyer and philosopher Ronald Dworkin. Relying on the concept of Dworkin, the author by the method of analogy provides arguments in support of his hypothesis. The confirmation of the proposed idea is also found in the decisions of international courts. Serious analysis of the legal framework, doctrinal sources and judicial practice was conducted in the course of writing the article.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>право на благоприятную окружающую среду</kwd><kwd>благоприятная окружающая среда</kwd><kwd>принцип права</kwd><kwd>норма права</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>right to favorable environment</kwd><kwd>favorable environment</kwd><kwd>healthy environment</kwd><kwd>principle of law</kwd><kwd>norm of law</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Дворкин Р. О правах всерьез. М., 2004.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Dvorkin, R. On Rights Seriously [O pravah vser’ez]. 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