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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">tal</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Теоретическая и прикладная юриспруденция</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Theoretical and Applied Law</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">3034-2813</issn><publisher><publisher-name>СЗИУ РАНХиГС</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22394/2686-7834-2022-2-50-58</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">tal-179</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Правосубъектность «электронного лица»: теоретический анализ</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Legal Personality of an “Electronic Person”: Theoretical Analysis</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Тютчева</surname><given-names>Е. С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Tiutcheva</surname><given-names>E. S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Тютчева Евгения Сергеевна, магистрант</p><p>Казань</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Evgeniya S. Tiutcheva, candidate for a master’s degree</p><p>Kazan</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">estiutcheva@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Казанский (Приволжский) федеральный университет</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Kazan Federal University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>07</day><month>07</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>50</fpage><lpage>58</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Тютчева Е.С., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Тютчева Е.С.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Tiutcheva E.S.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.taljournal.ru/jour/article/view/179">https://www.taljournal.ru/jour/article/view/179</self-uri><abstract><p>Статья посвящена вопросу возможности использования существующих концепций правосубъектности при конструировании правового статуса искусственного интеллекта. В статье рассматриваются его свойства в сравнении с физическими и юридическими лицами, делается вывод о том, что полное использование правосубъектности таких лиц, как правового базиса при разработке соответствующей правосубъектности у ≪электронного лица≫, является некорректным. Отдельно рассмотрен вопрос об ответственности искусственного интеллекта. В работе акцентируется внимание на недопущении смешивания понятий объекта и субъекта права в отношении искусственного интеллекта, обозначаются тенденции в развитии правового регулирования его правосубъектности, делается вывод, что в настоящих современных условиях ≪электронное лицо≫ наиболее близко по своему содержанию к понятию ≪квазисубъект≫.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article is devoted to the question of the possibility of using existing concepts of legal personality in the construction of the legal status of artificial intelligence (AI). The article examines the properties of AI in comparison with individuals and legal entities, and concludes that the full use of their legal personality as a legal basis for the electronic person’s legal personality is incorrect. Separately it’s considered the issue of the AI’s responsibility. The paper focuses on the prevention of mixing the concepts of the object and subject of law in relation to AI, identifies trends in the development of legal regulation of its legal personality, and concludes that in these modern conditions, the “electronic person” is closest in its content to the concept of “quasi-entity”.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>правосубъектность</kwd><kwd>искусственный интеллект</kwd><kwd>электронное лицо</kwd><kwd>ответственность</kwd><kwd>субъект права</kwd><kwd>объект права</kwd><kwd>квазисубъект</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>legal personality</kwd><kwd>legal status</kwd><kwd>artificial intelligence</kwd><kwd>electronic person</kwd><kwd>responsibility</kwd><kwd>subject of law</kwd><kwd>object of law</kwd><kwd>quasi-entity</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Гаджиев Г. А. 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