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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">tal</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Теоретическая и прикладная юриспруденция</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Theoretical and Applied Law</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">3034-2813</issn><publisher><publisher-name>СЗИУ РАНХиГС</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22394/2686-7834-2022-1-7-44</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">tal-153</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>АНТИМОНОПОЛЬНОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ КАК СИМПТОМ ДИСФУНКЦИИ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ СИСТЕМЫ</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>ANTIMONOPOLISM AS A SYMPTOM OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Вудкок</surname><given-names>Рамси А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Woodcock</surname><given-names>Ramsi A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Рамси А. Вудкок – доцент, Юридический колледж Розенберга Университета Кентукки, факультет менеджмента, Гаттонский колледж бизнеса и экономики Университета Кентукки</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ramsi A. Woodcock – Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law, Secondary Appointment, Department of Management, University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business &amp; Economics.</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Университет Кентукки</institution><country>Соединённые Штаты Америки</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>University of Kentucky</institution><country>United States</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>15</day><month>04</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>7</fpage><lpage>44</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Вудкок Р.А., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Вудкок Р.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Woodcock R.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.taljournal.ru/jour/article/view/153">https://www.taljournal.ru/jour/article/view/153</self-uri><abstract><p>Современный интерес американцев к использованию антимонопольного регулирования для решения проблемы имущественного неравенства является симптомом дисфункции американской политической системы, а не проявлением стремления к решению проблемы неравенства. При этом как первые представители американского прогрессивизма сто лет назад, так и современный экономист Тома Пикетти, чья работа привлекла повышенное внимание к проблеме неравенства доходов, солидарны в том, что источником неравенства является дефицит, а не монополия, и поэтому оно будет сохраняться даже на совершенно конкурентных рынках. Единственное эффективное решение для борьбы с неравенством — это использование налоговых инструментов, а не потенциально разрушительная борьба с монополистами путем их разделения.</p><p>Есть две причины, по которым в настоящее время в Соединенных Штатах меры антимонопольного регулирования получают широкую популярность. Во-первых, это расцвет антиэтатизма в США, который привел к отказу от использования налоговых инструментов для решения проблемы неравенства, вынуждая ученых и активистов искать иные обходные пути в рамках антимонопольной политики. Во-вторых, американская пресса, которая активно пропагандирует необходимость применения антимонопольных мер в целях выиграть борьбу с корпорациями Google и Facebook за рекламные доходы. Учитывая истоки происхождения современного американского антимонополизма, можно сделать вывод о том, что правительствам других стран, стремящимся решить проблему неравенства, не следует руководствоваться американским опытом, особенно если у них есть возможность использовать инструменты налоговой политики.</p><p>Редакция выражает признательность автору за предоставленную возможность опубликовать перевод статьи на русский язык.  Статью на английском языке, включая изменения, внесенные после публикации настоящего перевода, вы можете найти на сайте https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/jgucv/  The editors express their gratitude to the author for the opportunity to publish the translation of the article into Russian. This research was supported by a grant from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. The original English version of this article, as well as updates made after the creation of this translation, can be found at https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/jgucv/).</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Contemporary American interest in using antitrust law to address wealth inequality is a symptom of American political dysfunction rather than a reﬂection of any intellectual advance regarding the sources of inequality. Indeed, both the original American progressives of a century ago, as well as Thomas Piketty, whose work sparked contemporary intellectual interest in inequality, agree that inequality’s source is scarcity, rather than monopoly, and so will persist even in perfectly competitive markets. The only real solution is taxation, not a potentially destructive campaign of breakup. There are two causes of contemporary American antimonopolism. The ﬁrst is American anti-statism, which has closed off tax policy as a viable political solution to inequality, forcing scholars and activists to seek a secondor third-bestworkaroundinantitrustpolicy. Thesecondisthe Americanpress, whichisactivelypromotingantimonopolism as a way of ﬁghting back against Google and Facebook, two companies that have badly outcompeted the press for advertising dollars in recent years. Given these idiosyncratic roots of contemporary American antimonopolism, other jurisdictions seeking to address inequality may have little to gain from following the American example, particularly if taxation remains a viable policy option for them.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>антимонопольные меры</kwd><kwd>прогрессивизм</kwd><kwd>антиэтатизм</kwd><kwd>налоговые меры</kwd><kwd>неравенство</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>antimonopolism</kwd><kwd>progressivism</kwd><kwd>Anti-Etatism</kwd><kwd>tax</kwd><kwd>inequality</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Atkinson, A., Stiglitz, J. The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 1976.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Atkinson, A., Stiglitz, J. The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. Pub. 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